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To the extent that it acted in international relations, the European Community 
(and European Political Cooperation) was frequently described as a ‘civilian 
power’, because it lacked, military instruments and relied on economic and 
diplomatic means to try to influence other actors. Paradoxically, just as it seemed 
that civilian power would be the dominant mode of post-Cold War international 
relations, the Member States began to discuss establishing a common defence 
policy. The Maastricht Treaty contained provisions for using the Western 
European Union (WEU) as the defence arm of the European Union's new 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).1 The issue of a common defence 
policy was further discussed at the 1996-1997 Intergovernmental Conference, and 
while the Member States did not agree on proposals for an EU-WEU merger, the 
1997 Amsterdam Treaty does provide for closer EU-WEU links.2 The widespread 
perception is that the European Union will be unable to act effectively in 
international affairs unless it can use military instruments. European 
Commissioner Hans van den Broek has argued: ‘To be credible, the Union needs _ 
power behind its diplomacy and power to act if diplomacy fails.’3
This paper* will analyse the EU's foreign policy tooli, taking into account 
developments in the Amsterdam Treaty. The first section will examine the extent 
to which the EU can use four general types of policy instruments: propaganda 
diplomatic, economic and military. Does it have instruments associated- with 
traditi&Tlal foreign policy? While the EU has at its disposal several traditional 
foreign policy instruments, it also lacks several, most notably of the military type. 
However, the EU can also wield sui generis instruments which states cannot use.
Section two will consider the ways in which the EU utilises its instruments 
to try to influence other actors. The EU tends not to use them coercively, but 
prefers instead to use them to foster dialogue and interdependence. This is for a 
variety of reasons, ranging from the exigencies of compromise among the 
Member States (which can hinder the taking of strong negative measures) to a 
more profound aversion to using coercion.
The final section will take up the question of whether the EU needs to 
acquire military instruments to exercise greater influence in international affairs 
and fulfil its foreign policy ambitions. Expectations about what the EU can do 
have been running ahead of capabilities4: a re-evaluation of the EU's aims could 
lead to a better appreciation of its strengths and of the merits of civilian power. 
Military instruments are not the panacea they appear to be, and the abandonment
* I would like to thank several people who offered helpful comments on early versions of this 
paper: Jan Zielonka, Christopher Hill, Richard Rosecrance, Renaud Dehousse, and the 



























































































of the civilian power image may not bring the advantages that are currently 
anticipated.
Policy instruments classified
Foreign policy instruments are those means used by policy-makers in their 
attempts to get other international actors to do what they would not otherwise do.5 
David Baldwin has specified four types of instruments used in national foreign 
policy:
propaganda, or the deliberate manipulation of verbal symbols; 
diplomacy, or the reliance on negotiation;
economic, or resources which have a reasonable semblance of a 
market price in terms of money ; and
military, or the reliance on violence, weapons, or force.
The following four sub-sections will discuss the extent to which the EU has or 
has used policy instruments of these four general types, and thus the extent to 
which it can be compared to a traditional state actor. Of course, even where the 
EU does possess instruments, it must overcome two ‘hurdles.’
The first is the familiar problem of ‘consisteney’. There are essentially two 
different frameworks (pillars, in Maastricht Treaty parlance) for making foreign 
policy decisions: the European Community for foreign economic policy, and the 
intergovernmental CFSP procedures for ‘political’ decisions.6 Granted, the 
dividing line between the two frameworks can be fuzzy: an increasing number of 
‘global approaches’ have been devised, which combine instruments from both 
frameworks.7 Furthermore, the Commission can make CFSP proposals (which it 
could not do under the old European Political Cooperation framework), CFSP 
actions can be funded by the EC budget, and there has been some EC-CFSP 
institutional synthesis.8 Nonetheless, the formal separation between the two 
pillars remains, as does the need to ensure that policies agreed upon, and the 
instruments used in both are, at the very least, consistent with each other.
A second hurdle is that of the division of competences between the EU and 
the Member States. Some of the instruments (mainly economic) discussed below 
are formally EC instruments. But the Member States use many other instruments 




























































































diplomatic sanctions). Other instruments (such as regional political dialogue) 
have been developed in the context of the Community, EPC, or Union, and it may 
be inconceivable to use them outside of that framework, but they are not under its 
exclusive jurisdiction. That Member States still control many instruments means 
that decisions to use those instruments collectively are made case by case (and 
often by unanimous vote), and can thus be inconsistent.9
It should be noted here that although the CFSP contains provisions on 
taking common positions and joint actions, these are not instruments per se. They 
are better seen as mechanisms for making decisions to use foreign policy 
instruments.10 Decisions to use diplomatic instruments tend to be either common 
positions or joint actions (as discussed below).
Propaganda instruments
Propaganda differs from diplomatic instruments in that it is used to influence 
foreign publics, rather than governments." The Union lacks the machinery 
(external information programs, control of media) needed to produce propaganda, 
although the Commission produces information on the EU, directed to both 
Member State and foreign audiences. The EU issues CFSP declarations, but these 
are primarily directed at governments (though press statements are also released). 
Deliberately manipulating words would be difficult to do, since declarations are 
not only often the result of careful compromise among the Member States, but 
can be interpreted differently by them when they communicate with other states.
It is also a matter of foreign policy style. Sensationalisation and the 
manipulation of stereotypes, typical propaganda techniques, are absent in EU 
foreign policy. It seems improbable that the EU would be accused, as the US 
recently has been, of ‘rhetorical overkill.’12
Diplomatic instruments
The EU, as set up under the Maastricht Treaty, does not have ‘legal personality’; 
only the Community and/or the Member States can assume legal obligations with 
outsiders. The Community has the power to reach agreements on relations with 
other international organizations (articles 229-231 of the EEC Treaty), conclude 
association agreements with third countries (article 238), and negotiate and 
conclude agreements on commercial policy (article 113).13
The Community has concluded trade, trade and cooperation, or association 
agreements with most states in the world.14 Often they include arrangements for 




























































































are also provided by the increasing number of diplomatic missions to the 
Communities in Brussels, as well as by the Commission's and the Member States' 
representatives abroad.15
The Community's competence to conclude international agreements, 
however, does not cover areas outside its field of internal action. It did not have 
exclusive competence over all of the matters covered in the GATT Uruguay 
Round final agreement, for example, so the Member States also ratified it. Other 
‘mixed’ agreements include the Lomé conventions (governing relations between 
the EU and 70 African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries) and, frequently, 
association agreements.16 The Maastricht Treaty explicitly endorsed the Member 
States' competence to negotiate in international organisations and to conclude 
international agreements in the fields of monetary policy, environment, and 
development cooperation.17
On the ‘foreign policy’ side, there is no single diplomatic service and no 
permanent spokesperson who conveys positions and policies to the EU public and 
non-member countries. Instead this task is carried out by the rotating presidency 
(assisted, if necessary, by the previous and future presidencies and the 
Commission: the troika system). The Amsterdam Treaty states that the presidency 
will also be assisted in this task by the Council's Secretary-General, which may 
provide the Union with more continuity in its international representation.18
The Member States have agreed, on occasion, to coordinate their positions 
in international negotiations, such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (CSCE) and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty talks.19 During 
negotiations in which both economic and political issues are discussed, agreement 
on mixed representation (Commission and EPC/CFSP) must be worked out.20
Thus, the EU hardly ‘speaks with one voice’ in international affairs. The 
division of competences between the Member States and the Union, and between 






































































































(bilateral and regional) 
Offering EU membership 
Making peace proposals 
Sending special envoys 
Sponsoring peace conferences 
Sending cease-fire monitors 





























































































When the EU does speak and act collectively, it has wielded the diplomatic 
instruments listed in table 1. Most of these instruments are used by traditional 
states, though some are more unusual. Many were used by EPC, at least in its 
later stage (including pro-active instruments such as sending cease-fire monitors, 
to Yugoslavia). Since the Maastricht Treaty entered into force, the EU has been 
relatively more active, for example, deciding on joint actions to send envoys and 
election observers to non-member countries. For all but one (EU membership), 
decisions to use these instruments are taken within the CFSP framework.
Although démarches and declarations have been the most frequently used 
instruments (by EPC and CFSP), neither are mentioned in formal documents such 
as the London Report, Single European Act, or Maastricht Treaty. Démarches are 
generally confidential messages to other governments, delivered by the 
ambassadors of the troika (or just the presidency). They request further 
information on policies or express concern about developments (often relating to 
human rights).21
EPC declarations (or statements) were used to express concern, condemn, 
announce punitive measures, express satisfaction, encourage specific diplomatic 
activities, or announce Community initiatives. CFSP statements are generally 
used for the same tasks.22 CFSP common positions are more formal and tend to 
specify the EU's aims. They have been used to announce punitive measures 
(sanctions) and EU initiatives.23
The EU's positions or concerns can be transmitted ‘in person.’ The troika 
or Council president will visit non-member countries to state the EU's position.24 
The Member States have also jointly supported action by international 
organisations to criticise other states, such as sponsoring UN resolutions.25
The Member States have agreed to impose jointly diplomatic sanctions, 
such as withdrawing ambassadors, expelling military personnel in third country 
representations, and suspension of high-level contacts. Implementation of these 
measures is necessarily national.26
Concerted diplomatic recognition has recently been attempted: the 
Yugoslav republics were to have been recognised jointly. But Germany 
unilaterally recognised Slovenia and Croatia in December 1991, and Greece 
blocked joint recognition of Macedonia, so several Member States went ahead 
and recognised it in December 1993. Bosnia/Herzegovina, though, was 




























































































Political dialogue is the key forum in which the EU exercises persuasion 
(see section II) and is also used as a ‘carrot’ in and of itself.27 At the end of 1994, 
the EU was engaged in 25 political dialogues, including with 8 groups of 
countries (such as ASEAN, Central America, and the Gulf Cooperation 
Council).28 The regional dialogues have been used to encourage regional 
cooperation, as well as to demonstrate political support.29 Dialogues with 
important partners (such as the bilateral dialogue with the US or the multilateral 
dialogue with the Central and East European associates) involve frequent 
meetings at several levels. Other dialogues (with India or the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, for example) take place less frequently, at lower levels, and may involve 
only the troika or the presidency. Generally, the only basis for the dialogue is an 
exchange of letters or a joint declaration, but the more recent association and 
cooperation agreements provide for political dialogue.
Offering EU membership has been used to influence other governments, 
although it is a very particular kind of instrument. It clearly is limited: 
membership is only open to European states. The prospect of EU membership for 
the Central and East European associates is proving to be the EU’s most powerful 
instrument to encourage them to undertake major economic and political reforms, 
and behave as good neighbours. The prospect of membership has also been 
extended to Cyprus, partly in the hope that it would relieve the stalemate there.
The Union (and EPC before it) has, on several occasions, tried to help 
resolve conflicts or potentially dangerous disputes, using a variety of instruments. 
Some of these are fairly low-key, such as advancing peace proposals or sending 
envoys to participate in the peace-making process.30 The EU has also taken more 
high-profile initiatives, namely in the former Yugoslavia. In 1991 and 1992, EPC 
attempted to mediate in the Yugoslav crisis. It tried to broker cease-fires, dispatch 
cease-fire monitors, set up a peace conference, and submit peace plans.
More unusually, the EU was assigned the task of administering the 
Bosnian city of Mostar, under the terms of the Washington agreement of February 
1994 (which created the Bosnian Federation and ended hostilities between 
Bosnian Muslims and Croats). The EU's mission was to create the conditions for 
the reunification of the city, by overcoming the division between Muslims and 
Croats. The EU's administration lasted from July 1994 to July 1996. An EU 
administrator was placed in charge, and the EU funded infrastructure repair and 
development and social services. The WEU supplied a team of policemen who 
tried to establish a unified police force.31
In addition, the EU has tried ‘preventive diplomacy’ and ‘peace building’.32 




























































































States) in Central and Eastern Europe, the EU sponsored the Pact for Stability. 
This was a series of conferences and roundtables between May 1994 and March 
1995, in which the associates were encouraged to reach agreements between 
themselves concerning minority rights and border disputes. To try to ensure 
peaceful transitions to democracy, the EU has sent election observers to Russia, 
South Africa, Mozambique, the Palestinian Authority, and Bosnia/Herzegovina. 
All of these instruments were employed through CFSP joint actions.
Economic instruments
The EU can wield a wide variety of economic instruments, as listed in table 2. 
These generally fall under the European Community's jurisdiction. However, 
there are several economic instruments that are not controlled exclusively by the 
Community. The Member States can still grant export credits,33 promote 
investment, and conclude economic cooperation agreements with third countries, 
as long as the provisions of their agreements do not violate the Community's 
Common Commercial Policy (CCP). They can tax and freeze foreign assets. 
Member states can provide debt relief, which has been, for example, a major part 





























































































The EU's Economic Instruments
Positive Measures
Conclusion of trade agreement 
Conclusion of trade and cooperation 
agreement
Conclusion of association agreement 




Granting inclusion in Generalised 
System of Preferences (GSP)
Providing aid
Extending loans (on more or less 
favourable terms)
Negative Measures
Embargo (ban on exports)
Boycott (ban on imports)
Delaying conclusion of agreements 





Reducing or suspending aid 





























































































Furthermore, the EU's resources are limited. The Community's budget in 
general is small, and only a small portion of the budget (5.6 per cent in 1996) is 
devoted to external action.34 Nonetheless, the Union can wield quite powerful 
economic instruments, stemming from its relative economic strength. It is still, for 
example, one of the world's largest aid donors.35 Imposing trade embargoes and 
offering trade concessions do not require budgetary funding (though they may 
exact other costs), and given that the EU is the world's largest trader, these can be 
very powerful instruments.
The explicit use of EC economic instruments to support EPC orientations 
did not begin until the early 1980s, in relation to economic sanctions on third 
countries. In practice, political considerations ‘spilled over’ into the Community's 
external economic relations, without intrusion from EPC - just as it had when it 
concluded a trade agreement with Romania in 1980 to reward that country's 
independent foreign policy vis à vis the Soviet bloc. Since the late 1980s, politics 
and economics have become more explicitly intertwined. Conditionality - or the 
use of (primarily) economic instruments to encourage democratic reforms and 
respect for human rights - has become an integral aspect of the EU’s foreign 
relations.
Trade, trade and cooperation, and association agreements have increasingly 
been used explicitly as foreign policy instruments.36 The decision to open 
negotiations with third countries is frequently a political one, but not necessarily 
one taken first in CFSP.37 The EU often holds out the promise of such agreements 
if the country concerned meets certain political and economic conditions. 
Negotiation and conclusion of an agreement will also reflect political support for 
the country.38 The content of agreements (schedule of trade liberalisation, 
intensity and scope of economic cooperation, and provisions for political 
dialogue) further reflects EU ‘approval.’39
Rewards are provided to countries according to the new rules on the 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). Additional preferences will be given to 
countries that apply ILO conventions on freedom of association and child labour, 
and International Tropical Timber Organisation standards on forest
40management.
Aid has been extended or increased for political reasons. The 
Community/Union has given aid to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
to boost the process of political and economic reforms there, and thus help ensure 
security and stability. The extension of (non-humanitarian) aid is also conditional 
- dependent on the recipients meeting certain political and economic criteria.41 




























































































regional cooperation initiatives. The Union has extended loans to third countries 
as well.43
As for negative measures, the practice of imposing EC trade sanctions was 
controversial through the early 1980s, because some Member States objected to 
the use of Community instruments for overt political purposes. The first time 
Community sanctions were imposed, following an EPC decision, was against the 
Soviet Union in 1982, with respect to the imposition of martial law in Poland. It 
then became practice for a political orientation regarding sanctions to be defined 
in EPC and implemented through EC instruments.44
Economic sanctions could include measures that the Member States then 
implemented on a national basis, because they fell under national jurisdiction. For 
example, the 1986 ban on new investments in South Africa was decided in EPC, 
but implemented, via a loosely-binding Council decision, by each Member 
State.45 In the early 1990s, however, services were included in EC regulations 
based on article 113 (CCP) imposing sanctions on Iraq, Libya, and 
Serbia/Montenegro (in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions), even 
though there has been a debate over whether the article includes services.46
The Maastricht Treaty codified and extended the procedures for imposing 
sanctions. Article 228a provides for the interruption of economic relations with 
third countries, following a common position or joint action adopted 
(unanimously) to that effect in CFSP. Importantly, article 228a covers all 
economic relations, not just trade or the provision of services. Furthermore, under 
article 73g, the Council can take negative measures also with respect to capital 
movements and payments 47
Other negative measures that the EU can take include delaying the signing 
or conclusion of agreements,48 or even suspending or denouncing agreements. In 
May 1992, the Council decided that agreements with other CSCE states would 
contain a clause either permitting the agreement to be suspended if human rights 
and democratic principles are not respected, or providing for appropriate 
measures to be taken if the parties fail to meet their obligations, including respect 
for human rights and democratic principles (the non-execution clause). In May 
1995, the Council agreed that all future agreements with third countries would 
contain the non-execution clause.49 A state can also be withdrawn from the list of 
GSP beneficiaries if it practices forced labour, exports goods made by prison 
labour, fails to control the export or transit of illegal drugs, or fails to comply with 




























































































Economie aid has been cut off or reduced as a result of EPC/CFSP 
decisions on sanctions, as in the 1995 case of Nigeria. In October 1991, following 
a military coup in Haiti, the Commission suspended aid (provided under the 
Lomé IV agreement); the decision was then endorsed in EPC.51 Aid to Sudan, 
Zaire, and Malawi has been suspended for human rights violations.52
Military instruments
The EU's lack of a military capability is its most conspicuous instrument ‘deficit.’ 
Collective defence was, and still is, the domain of NATO, and Member States 
retain national forces. Denmark, Greece, and neutral Ireland opposed even 
discussing defence matters in EPC. However, in both EPC and CFSP, the 
Member States have agreed to impose arms embargoes, although these are 
implemented nationally.53 In addition, military personnel have been subject to 
diplomatic sanctions.
The end of the Cold Wen put defence on the agenda. The withdrawal of 
many US forces from Western Europe, the Gulf War, and the Yugoslav crisis 
seemed to indicate that the Community/EPC needed to provide for its own 
defence and to back up diplomatic and economic sanctions with military 
capability. Increasingly, the WEU (little more than a framework for discussing 
defence issues) was seen as a potential military arm, and this was reflected in the 
Maastricht Treaty.54 Under article J.4(2) of the CFSP, the EU can request the 
WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions which have defence 
implications. Thus far, the WEU has only been involved in one EU joint action, 
that on Mostar (see above).55
Although an EU-WEU merger has been repeatedly proposed, the UK and 
the neutral Member States in particular oppose it. The Amsterdam Treaty states 
that close institutional relations are to be fostered with the WEU; if the European 
Council so decides, the WEU could eventually be integrated into the Union. The 
EU can avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions relating to 
humanitarian and rescue, peacekeeping, and crisis-management tasks (including 
peacemaking);56 all Member States could participate in these tasks, even if they 
are not full WEU members.57
The WEU has been developing its operational capacity. The Combined 
Joint Task Force (CJTF) framework, launched at the January 1994 NATO 
summit, is also supposed to help remedy the WEU's weaknesses. WEU forces 
would be able to use NATO assets (logistics and intelligence) in out-of-area 




























































































which raises the issue of a potential US veto of the use of military instruments by 
the EU/WEU.
Instruments, power, and context
Given the combined weight of the Member States, the EU must be considered 
potentially a very influential international actor. It has at its disposal many of the 
same traditional foreign policy instruments used by states, as well as a few unique 
ones. In comparison to other international organisations (even the UN), it can 
certainly wield more foreign policy instruments. But the EU also lacks several 
instruments, even in economic areas. In addition, the EU's use of the instruments 
can be hindered because the division of competences between the Community 
and CFSP, and between the national and European levels, is still contested. The 
Member States must agree unanimously to use many of the instruments that the 
EU does have (and frequently they do not). Reaching agreement among the 
Member States can entail compromising the ‘strength’ of the measures taken, 
which could thus reduce the EU's potential influence. Resources are also 
necessarily limited and choices must be made about where and when to utilise 
them. How effective the EU will be will depend on context (influence in some 
situations may simply be difficult to exercise), as well as on how the EU decides 
to wield its instruments and for what purpose.
How does the EU use its instruments?
Providing that agreement can be reached on a common policy or approach, how 
does the Union use its policy instruments? There are six ways in which an 
international actor can influence other international actors. It can:
use persuasion (elicit a favourable response without explicitly




inflict non-violent punishment; or
use force.58
Which techniques seem to be preferred by the EU? (We can obviously exclude 
the use of force, because the Union has yet to use it.) Broadly speakings there-is-a~ 
preference for using persuasion and ‘carrots^ (offering/granting rewards), over 
‘sticks’ (threatening or inflicting punishments).59 Rather than coerce other actors, 




























































































responsibly, cooperate with each other, or democratise and respect human 
rights.60
Extending the promise of an agreement or aid when countries meet certain 
conditions has become a regular practice. In December 1996, for example, the EU 
promised to negotiate a cooperation agreement with Cuba if the Cuban authorities 
make progress towards democracy.61 Negotiation and conclusion of agreements 
can then be delayed, if needed. Negotiations on trade and cooperation agreements 
with Romania and Bulgaria were suspended in 1989 because of concerns about 
human rights abuses there.
But the EU clearly has difficulties breaking off relations that have already 
been established.62 Sanctions have, of course, been imposed on third countries, 
often in accordance with UN decisions, and the Community/Union has initiated 
international sanctions (as in Yugoslavia).63 But unilateral negative measures 
seem harder to take, especially over the issue of human rights and democracy. 
The Community suspended development cooperation (aid) with weak states, such 
as Sudan and Haiti. With respect to more important third countries, such as 
Algeria and Indonesia, the EU relies on persuasion or démarches and 
declarations.
The reluctance to use coercion can make manifest serious inconsistencies 
in the EU's approach. While CFSP statements condemn the behaviour of a state, 
trade concessions and aid flows remain unaffected. Aid can even serve as an 
alternative to negative measures: in June 1996, the Council supported aid to 
improve the human rights situation in East Timor, but has not imposed negative 
measures on Indonesia over the issue.64
There are several reasons for this reluctance. Commercial interests were 
part of the reason why the 1986 sanctions against South Africa affected only 3.5 
per cent of EC-South African trade,65 and why sanctions against China have not 
been reconsidered since 1990.66 The EU's ‘critical dialogue’ with Iran left 
Member States free to import Iranian oil; oil was also not included in the list of 
sanctions imposed on Nigeria in 1995.
The reluctance to use coercion for primarily commercial reasons is not, of 
course, limited to the EU. US policy towards China is also heavily influenced by 
commercial interests. But there are other reasons why the EU hesitates to use 
coercive measures, which are specific to the Union.
The need to reach a compromise among the Member States can entail 




























































































States could only agree to impose diplomatic (rather than economic) sanctions on 
Syria, but ‘[t]he Twelve did not come to the rational view that the wider interest 
required a moderate approach; the moderate approach was all that they could 
manage in the face of differing national positions.’67
Delaying agreements can reflect the interests of one Member State in 
impeding the development of relations with a third country. This can happen 
when unanimity is required to proceed with a positive measure. Portugal is 
blocking the signing of a new EU-ASEAN cooperation agreement in protest of 
the Indonesian annexation of East Timor.68 Greece has frequently slowed the 
development of relations with Turkey, ostensibly over human rights abuses.69 But 
such objections have not been enough to prompt the EU to break off relations, 
which likewise requires unanimity. The EU's ‘message’ is thus unclear.
There are also more profound objections to the use of coercion. The 
Community’s reaction in 1982 to the Polish crisis differed greatly from that of the 
United States, and exemplifies its different approach to coercion. The US 
imposed sanctions on Poland and the Soviet Union. This fit with its general 
opposition to trade and economic cooperation with the Soviet bloc. The EC, in 
contrast, reluctantly imposed (rather limited) sanctions against the Soviet Union, 
under pressure from the US. The Member States considered it more important to 
maintain trade ties and detente with their eastern neighbours, as a way of 
stabilising political relations and reducing the military threat in Europe.70 Jan 
Zielonka has labelled these two different approaches interdependence and 
economic containment.71
Although conditionality is increasingly used in the EU’s foreign relations, 
the emphasis is still on positive measures. There is some opposition within the 
EU to applying strict conditionality because it would isolate those states that most 
needed aid and ties with the EU and generate instability. Integration, dialogue, 
and trade should be used to engender democracy, economic reforms and ‘good 
behaviour.’ Sanctions may only hurt the population, or cause it to rally to the 
government's support. In addition, the EU cannot exercise influence if it has no 
ties to the country concerned.
These dilemmas were evident in the debates over the response to the 
Russian intervention in Chechnya in December 1994. In early 1995, the EU 
delayed the conclusion of an interim trade agreement with Russia and insisted 
that Russia accept an international monitoring mission in Chechnya; by June, the 
EU had decided to proceed with the agreement even though fighting was still 




























































































cooperation networks prevailed over the view that it should be coerced into 
stopping the fighting.72
The EU's aversion to negative measures has recently led to clashes with the 
US over relations with Cuba and Iran. The US has banned trade with the two 
countries; the EU had been engaged in a critical dialogue with Iran, and is 
promising to expand cooperation with Cuba.73 Both approaches may actually be 
indicative of the limits to outsiders' influence on developments within other 
countries. On the US position towards Iran, one observer has argued, ‘Seventeen 
years of constant pressure have wrought little change. Clinton's confrontational 
approach may not fare better, given the lack of support by US allies.’74 A New 
York Times editorial on US policy towards Cuba charged that ‘neither Congress 
nor President Clinton seems inclined to try anything more creative than the 
isolation strategy that over nearly four decades has failed to budge Fidel Castro 
from his autocratic ways.’75 But the EU's critical dialogue with Iran did not 
succeed in persuading Iran to respect human rights and behave more responsibly 
in international affairs.76
It is not utopian to maintain that fostering interdependence and dialogue 
could have a positive influence. The EU is well-equipped to pursue such a 
strategy. But a preference for persuasion and carrots opens it up to charges of 
complicity and appeasement.77 Sanctions might be necessary just to express the 
EU's displeasure with a country's behaviour. Inconsistent use of sticks and carrots 
may eventually lessen the EU's influence.
Paradoxically, the EU has been busy discussing how to augment its 
coercive capacity, by wielding military instruments. But simply increasing a 
potential capacity to use coercion does not mean the EU will be any more willing 
or able to do so. Nor is it clear that it should do so: military instruments may not 
be any more effective than the EU's other instruments.
The end of civilian power in Europe?
Several observers have argued that civilian power is of limited utility in a world 
fdled with leaders, groups and countries willing to use force to achieve their 
goals. For Michael Clarke, the Union's potential to encourage peaceful behaviour 
is limited to the long run, because ‘economic interdependence, international 
institutionalism, and the incentive to join prosperous security communities are 




























































































The Community/EPC experience in Yugoslavia is often cited. It used 
several diplomatic instruments to try to solve the crisis and then employed the full 
gamut of negative economic measures against the former Yugoslavia, yet it could 
not coerce the parties into reaching an agreement.
Although the possibility of a WEU intervention was discussed, most 
Member States proved extremely reluctant to make use of military force. This, 
together with the fact that the WEU's operational capabilities continue to be 
extremely limited, seriously weakened the Member States' leverage over the 
warring parties and clearly illustrated the limits of 'civilian power' instruments 
such as diplomatic negotiations and trade sanctions.79
The 1996-1997 Intergovernmental Conference discussed various proposals 
to develop the EU’s ability to respond to crises using armed force. Collective 
defence will remain NATO's primary responsibility, but the Amsterdam Treaty 
provides for closer EU-WEU institutional links, and for the possibility that all the 
Member States could participate in WEU-implemented humanitarian, 
peacekeeping, and crisis management operations. Even though the Amsterdam 
Treaty disappointed those who advocated an EU-WEU merger, the EU still seems 
to be heading towards an expansion of its military capabilities and the issue of a 
common defence policy remains on the agenda.
There are, however, several reasons to object to this move. It could raise 
‘jurisdictional’ problems with NATO, which is even busier developing its peace­
keeping and intervention capabilities.80 It could also weaken the UN:
[I]t will presumably be the aim of members of the Union to support the peace­
keeping role of the United Nations. To maintain an independent military peace­
keeping force would cast doubt on this aim. And if the primacy of the United 
Nations' peace-keeping responsibility is recognized, it matters little whether the 
Community's contribution is made through national or Community contingents.81
More importantly, the assumption seems to be that if the EU can use force, 
its influence will increase: ‘[t]he Union’s foreign policy suffers from its inability 
to project credible military force.’82 Yet this assumption is based on an optimistic 
view of the utility and effectiveness of military force. As Ken Booth has argued:
In their instinct to 'do something', many people seem to have forgotten the 
limited utility of foreign forces in complex conflicts whose terrain features 
forests, mountains, cities and sanctuaries: Vietnam, Afghanistan, Beirut and 
Belfast. There is a dangerous over-confidence in military force in some quarters, 




























































































It is by no means clear that military force can help resolve conflicts; there 
may be little that outsiders can, or should, do. Intervention in internal conflicts 
(even for humanitarian purposes) is simply not considered legitimate unless 
sanctioned by the UN. Given this, it would be better to concentrate on improving 
the UN's ability to intervene.
The EU's concentration on acquiring an intervention capability is also 
paradoxical in that states in practice have been hesitant to intervene at all in 
conflicts: witness the discussions over sending soldiers to Albania or Zaire, in 
1996-1997. And assigning international forces tasks over and above protecting 
humanitarian deliveries is controversial.84
A civilian EU is preferred because ‘security’ in the post-Cold War world 
has acquired a much broader connotation than military security: threats to security 
within and between states arise from a variety of sources, including ethnic 
disputes, violations of human rights, and economic deprivation. And the EU is 
very well placed to address the long-term causes of insecurity. Mathias Jopp has 
argued, ‘as many conflicts and tensions are rooted in political, social and 
economic instabilities, the Union is much better equipped than any other 
international organisation to address related problems.’85 As Christopher Hill has 
written, ‘Its comparative advantage is in the long-term effort to change the 
environments out of which crises tend to spring — so as to inoculate against 
them.’86
The end of the civilian power image would entail giving up far too much 
for far too little. An EU intervention capability could be seen by outsiders as a 
step towards the creation of a superpower that uses military instruments to pursue 
its own interests. Of course, one could argue that based on its past record, the EU 
would probably not behave as the superpowers did during the Cold War. 
Nevertheless, it would signal the end of the EU's (potential or actual) contribution 
to a different kind of international relations, in which civilian instruments are 
wielded on behalf of a collectivity which had renounced the use of force among 
its members and encouraged others to do the same.87
Conclusion
Rather than seeing military force as a panacea, the EU should re-examine the use 
of the instruments it has already. Removing the divisive issue of a common 
defence policy from the agenda could make way for such a re-appraisal. The 
division of competences between the Community and CFSP, and between the 




























































































instruments; overcoming this division, however, requires Member State 
agreement. Clearly the way in which the EU is represented in international 
negotiations and organisations could be reformed. The barriers between the 
pillars could be smoothed. ‘Global approaches’ combining a variety of 
instruments, seem to be a promising strategy (in particular because they exploit 
the Union's strengths) and could be used more often. While employing coercion 
would still require Member State agreement - a greater capacity for policy 
analysis and planning (as provided for in the Amsterdam Treaty) could indicate 
when a stronger negative message should be sent.
More importantly, however, a re-evaluation of the EU's strengths would 
show that civilian power could be effective, providing the Member States are 
willing to cooperate on foreign policy issues. If they agree on common ‘civilian’ 
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Cooperation (EPC) as codified in Title in  of the 1987 Single European Act. The third pillar 
provides for cooperation in justice and home affairs. The Maastricht Treaty renames the EEC as 
the European Community, but sometimes the term European Community implies all three 
European Communities, and sometimes it implies the Community and the member states acting 
within the bounds of EPC. In this paper, European Community refers to the old EEC; European 
Union refers to the collectivity (since 1993).
2
At the time of writing, the Treaty had not yet been ratified, so reference to it is necessarily 
provisional.
3
Hans van den Broek, ‘Why Europe Needs a Common Foreign and Security Policy’, European 
Foreign Affairs Review 1:1 (July 1996): 4.
4
As Christopher Hill argued in ‘The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's 
International Role,’ Journal o f Common Market Studies 31:2 (September 1993).
5 David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985): 8-9.
6 The Amsterdam Treaty maintains the formal division between the two frameworks.
7 For example, the pre-accession strategy for the Central and East European associates, approved 
by the Essen European Council in December 1994, mixes aid, economic cooperation, and 
political dialogue. This was not a CFSP decision. Other global approaches have been articulated 
first in CFSP (such as the 1994 common position on Rwanda). Under the Amsterdam Treaty, the 
European Council is to decide on ‘common strategies’, which could be a way to develop further 
global approaches.
g
An enlarged EPC Secretariat was merged into the Council Secretariat, several EPC and 
Council working groups were combined, and the Council (rather than the ministers of foreign 
affairs meeting within EPC) is formally acknowledged as the primary decision-making body. 
The Amsterdam Treaty clarifies the procedure for funding the CFSP (which had been a major 
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actions, but this first required a unanimous vote. Under the. Amsterdam Treaty, member states 
can abstain from CFSP votes. QMV can be used to adopt joint actions and common positions 
that are part of a common strategy, or to implement joint actions or common positions. But a 




























































































10 Recent common positions, for example, announce economic sanctions; recent joint actions 
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Stephen Hyett, The External Relations of the European Communities: A Manual o f Law and 
Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996): 215-220.
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This was a compromise on a proposal for a ‘Mr. or Ms. CFSP,’ who would play an important
role in formulating foreign policy and representing the EU.
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